Driven by a sharp increase in claims for reparations, reparative justice has become a topic of academic debate. To some extent this debate has been marred by a failure to realize the complexity of reparative justice. In this essay we try to amend this shortcoming. We do this by developing a taxonomy of different kinds of wrongs that can underwrite claims to reparations. We identify four kinds of wrongs: entitlement violations, unjust exclusions from an otherwise acceptable system of entitlements, and (...) two kinds where a social practice systematically fails to embody an acceptable system of entitlements. In deliberation about what is required to repair a historical injustice the weight of backward- and forward-looking considerations is a function of the distinctive features of the injustice in question. Hence, the first step in adjudicating claims for reparation is to identify what kind of wrong the claim arises from. From the taxonomy of wrongs we are thus able to construct what we call the Field of Reparative Justice, which illustrates how the structure of deliberation for reparative justice tracks the distinctive features of different kinds of wrongs. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to create dialectical space for a hitherto under-discussed option in the philosophy of conspiracy theories. The extant literature on the topic almost exclusively assumes that conspiracy theories are a type of explanation. The typical mental attitude towards explanations is belief, a representational attitude that can be assessed as true, false, warranted or unwarranted. I call models based on this assumption alethic models. Alethic models can’t pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental (...) attitudes without latching onto their negative epistemic properties. The extant literature therefore finds itself in an unfortunate situation. It either has to presume that conspiracy theories are epistemically defective in general (generalism). Or it has to deny that conspiracy theories are a distinct class of mental attitudes. Conspiracy theories are then nothing more than theories, theories about conspiracies, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (particularism). Instead, this paper motivates the research program of narrative models. According to narrative models, conspiracy theories are first and foremost stories – structured fictions. And their relevant mental attitudes are the attitudes of fiction – make-believe and imagination. Fictions are not subjects to epistemic norms. They are neither rational nor irrational. Narrative models can therefore pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental attitudes without labeling them as defective in general. In addition, they are able to explain certain features of conspiracy discourse particularly well, and they offer new perspectives on the popularity of conspiracy theories and the means of intervention we have at our disposal. (shrink)

Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first (...) appears to make the idea of the necessity of logical laws even less plausible, but eventually turns out to speak in favor of this view. (shrink)

Similarity and difference, patterns of variation, consistency and coherence: these are the reference points of the philosopher. Understanding experience, exploring ideas through particular instantiations, novel and innovative thinking: these are the reference points of the artist. However, at certain points in the proceedings of our Symposium titled, Next to Nothing: Art as Performance, this characterisation of philosopher and artist respectively might have been construed the other way around. The commentator/philosophers referenced their philosophical interests through the particular examples/instantiations created by the (...) artist and in virtue of which they were then able to engage with novel and innovative thinking. From the artists’ presentations, on the other hand, emerged a series of contrasts within which philosophical and artistic ideas resonated. This interface of philosopher-artist bore witness to the fact that just as art approaches philosophy in providing its own analysis, philosophy approaches art in being a co-creator of art’s meaning. In what follows, we discuss the conception of philosophy-art that emerged from the Symposium, and the methodological minimalism which we employed in order to achieve it. We conclude by drawing out an implication of the Symposium’s achievement which is that a counterpoint to Institutional theories of art may well be the point from which future directions will take hold, if philosophy-art gains traction. (shrink)

In recent decades, the use of electrochemistry has increased exponentially. Electrochemistry has demonstrated their effectiveness in the cleaning of manufactured effluents and the decomposition of complex hydrological compounds for water treatment. Looking at the efficiency of the technology in the decomposition of organic matter, one wonders if it is not capable of doing more than just the de-pollution and treatment of water. Of course, there are other uses of electrochemistry, but in the literature, it is understood that it is used (...) more for water treatment and de-pollution. This work is a review of the literature to identify the major works in electrochemical decomposition of organic matter to see to what extent this technology can be used for methane production (cooking gas) using pasty organic matter. The list of works appearing in this review is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient to give a clear idea of the technology, its progress and, above all, the challenges it faces. This review opens the way to other applications of electrochemical decomposition to meet today's energy challenges. (shrink)

Agents' Abilities ist ein Geschenk von einem Buch, das man nicht genug loben kann. Und deswegen versuche ich es erst gar nicht. Stattdessen beschränke ich mich auf einige konstruktiv-kritische Bemerkungen, die in zwei miteinander verbundenen Bereichen Perspektiven der Weiterentwicklung und Verfeinerung aufzeigen sollen.

Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. In principle, versions of the theory can be tested by experiments with (...) quantum computers. The upshot is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring. (shrink)

Harsanyi und Rawls haben zu der Frage, wie die wichtigen Güter in einem Staat verteilt sein sollten, zwei sehr ähnliche Theorien entwickelt, kommen aber zu unterschiedlichen Schlüssen. Harsanyi plädiert für eine utilitaristische Regel, Rawls dagegen für eine Regel, die sich auf diejenigen konzentriert, denen es in der Gesellschaft am schlechtesten geht. Die fast fünfzig Jahre andauernde Diskussion zwischen den beiden wird hier systematisch dargestellt und analysiert. Erstens wird gezeigt, dass sich unter Berücksichtigung von Abneigung gegen Risiko und abnehmendem Grenznutzen die (...) auf dem Urzustand beruhenden Argumentationen weitaus ähnlicher sind, als den Autoren bewusst ist. Allerdings gibt Harsanyis Theorie wahrscheinlich den Armen im Gegensatz zu Rawls nur relative und keine absolute Priorität. Zweitens wird allerdings die Argumentation über den Urzustand infrage gestellt. Dabei sprechen außerhalb des Urzustandes mehrere praktische Erwägungen tendenziell für Rawls’ Differenzprinzip. (shrink)

After a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of ontology, I raise objections against this view and defend an alternative account of the connection between particulars and their properties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different from Armstrong’s necessary connection between particulars and their properties.

Since the pioneering work of Birkhoff and von Neumann, quantum logic has been interpreted as the logic of (closed) subspaces of a Hilbert space. There is a progression from the usual Boolean logic of subsets to the "quantum logic" of subspaces of a general vector space--which is then specialized to the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space. But there is a "dual" progression. The notion of a partition (or quotient set or equivalence relation) is dual (in a category-theoretic sense) to (...) the notion of a subset. Hence the Boolean logic of subsets has a dual logic of partitions. Then the dual progression is from that logic of partitions to the quantum logic of direct-sum decompositions (i.e., the vector space version of a set partition) of a general vector space--which can then be specialized to the direct-sum decompositions of a Hilbert space. This allows the logic to express measurement by any self-adjoint operators rather than just the projection operators associated with subspaces. In this introductory paper, the focus is on the quantum logic of direct-sum decompositions of a finite-dimensional vector space (including such a Hilbert space). The primary special case examined is finite vector spaces over ℤ₂ where the pedagogical model of quantum mechanics over sets (QM/Sets) is formulated. In the Appendix, the combinatorics of direct-sum decompositions of finite vector spaces over GF(q) is analyzed with computations for the case of QM/Sets where q=2. (shrink)

Heute gibt es kaum jemanden mehr, der nicht mit Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien in Berührung gekommen wäre. Mit dem globalen Aufstieg des modernen Populismus und besonders seit Donald Trumps US-Präsidentschaft konnten sie von obskuren Internetfo-ren und dem Rand der Gesellschaft weiter als je zuvor in die öffentliche Debatte vordringen. Mit der zunehmenden Nutzung sozialer Medien und Messenger-Apps wie Telegram oder WhatsApp findet scheinbares Wissen ungehindert Verbreitung und direkten Zugang zu den Smartphones und Köpfen der Menschen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es (...) nicht verwunderlich, dass Verschwörungstheorien und Fake News auch Einzug ins Klassenzimmer halten. Dabei stehen Lehrer*innen vor vielen offenen Fragen. Wie sind diese Behauptungen im Einzelnen zu bewerten? Was zeichnet Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien aus und was genau macht sie problematisch? Wie, selbst wenn sie klarerweise falsch und unbegründet sind, sollte damit im Klassenzimmer umgegangen werden? Sollte man sie offen diskutieren? Oder sollte man die Diskussion darüber unterbinden? Hier werden grundlegende und komplexe Fragen der freien Meinungsbildung und -äußerung berührt, zu denen Grundgesetz, Beamten- und Schulrecht nur begrenzt Auskunft geben. In diesem Beitrag wollen uns zuerst ein klares Bild davon machen, was Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien eigentlich sind, warum manche Menschen sie für wahr halten und was daran problematisch ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund soll anschließend die Frage diskutiert werden, wie aus demokratie- und bildungstheoretischer Sicht mit Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien im Unterricht umgegangen werden sollte. (shrink)

Analogien lassen sich aus unserem vernünftigen Nachdenken und Argumentieren kaum wegdenken. Ganz zurecht stellen sie eines der klassischen Themen der Argumentationstheorie dar. Doch wie genau sollte die argumentative Rolle von Analogien in Argumentrekonstruktionen dargestellt werden? Das ist die Leitfrage dieses Beitrags. Zunächst wird mit Michael Dummetts Schach-Analogie ein prominentes Beispiel dargestellt und eine genauere Charakterisierung des Analogiebegriffs vorgeschlagen. Danach wird die gängigste Rekonstruktionsform von Analogien diskutiert, das Analogieargument, und in einigen Punkten verfeinert. Vor diesem Hintergrund schlägt der Beitrag eine zweite, (...) alternative Rekonstruktionsform vor, in der zwei analoge Argumente an die Stelle eines einzelnen Analogiearguments treten. Nachdem diese beiden Rekonstruktionsformen an einem weiteren berühmten Beispiel vorgeführt wurden, an Peter Singers Teich-Analogie, wird diskutiert, wie sich diese beiden Varianten gegenseitig ergänzen und welche Stärken und Schwächen sie haben. Es zeigt sich, dass Analogien nicht nur in Form von Analogieargumenten einen zentralen Topos eines Einzelarguments darstellen. Darüber hinaus kann die Untersuchung analoger Argumente bereits selbst als argumentationstheoretische Topik verstanden werden. (shrink)

Heideggers Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks ist einer der wichtigsten Beiträge zur philosophischen Ästhetik, zudem ein Schlüsseltext für Heideggers gesamtes Denken. Aber nicht ganz zu Unrecht gilt die Lektüre bei Studierenden und Anfängern im Denken Heideggers als schwierig. Dieser Band soll das Verständnis des Kunstwerkaufsatzes anleiten und erleichtern: In 18 Beiträgen stellen die Autoren in ihren Interpretationen die Grundgedanken und philosophischen sowie literarischen Quellen des Textes vor, verorten ihn in Heideggers Werk und und skizzieren seine philosophische Wirkung. Dieser erste kooperative Kommentar (...) zum Kunstwerkaufsatz schließt an das Vorwissen und die Interessen seiner Leser in vielerlei Hinsichten an, ermöglicht so einen leichteren Einstieg in die Lektüre und erschließt den Text aus verschiedenen Perspektiven der Philosophie und der Kunstwissenschaft. -/- Einen ersten Schwerpunkt bilden dabei thematische Einführungen, die das Verhältnis von Kunstwerken zu anderen Dingen, zur Technik, zur Natur, zu Wahrheit und Geschichte bestimmen. So erläutern die Beiträge Heideggers Bestimmung der Gestalt von Kunstwerken und seine These vom Vorrang der Dichtung. Ein zweiter Teil geht den Quellen des Kunstwerkaufsatzes in der Philosophie (Aristoteles, Heraklit, Hegel) und in der Literatur (Hölderlin, Meyer, Rilke) nach. Ein dritter Teil erläutert, wie Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks Heideggers eigenes Denken beeinflusst: seine Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche, seine Faszination für Paul Klee, sein nachdenken über Phänomenologie und über Sprache. Ein vierter Teil schließlich ist der Wirkung von Heideggers Text auf andere Autoren gewidmet: Adorno, die französische Phänomenologie (Lévinas, Derrida u.a.) sowie Gadamer und andere Autoren der hermeneutischen Tradition (Sallis, Figal). (shrink)

The notion of a partition on a set is mathematically dual to the notion of a subset of a set, so there is a logic of partitions dual to Boole's logic of subsets (Boolean logic is usually mis-specified as "propositional" logic). The notion of an element of a subset has as its dual the notion of a distinction of a partition (a pair of elements in different blocks). Boole developed finite logical probability as the normalized counting measure on elements of (...) subsets so there is a dual concept of logical entropy which is the normalized counting measure on distinctions of partitions. Thus the logical notion of information is a measure of distinctions. Classical logical entropy naturally extends to the notion of quantum logical entropy which provides a more natural and informative alternative to the usual Von Neumann entropy in quantum information theory. The quantum logical entropy of a post-measurement density matrix has the simple interpretation as the probability that two independent measurements of the same state using the same observable will have different results. The main result of the paper is that the increase in quantum logical entropy due to a projective measurement of a pure state is the sum of the absolute squares of the off-diagonal entries ("coherences") of the pure state density matrix that are zeroed ("decohered") by the measurement, i.e., the measure of the distinctions ("decoherences") created by the measurement. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the question of the possible influence of J. G. Fichte on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory of language. I first argue that the historical record is unclear, but show that there is a deep philosophical difference between the two views and, as a result of this difference, we should conclude that the influence was small. Drawing on a distinction made by Michael Dummett, I show that Fichte understands language as encoding thought while Humboldt understands language (...) as a medium of thought. The consequences of this difference affect a wide range of issues from their views on the nature of personal pronouns, to their theories of communicative understanding, to their theories of the proper nature of inquiry into language. (shrink)

Wir sorgen uns um die Wahrheit und unsere Sorge bedarf einer vorsichtigen Erörterung. Schnell sind Argumente gefunden, die belegen, dass wir ohne Wahrheit nicht auskommen. Wahre Meinungen sind von überragendem instrumentellem Nutzen, in allen Lebensbereichen ist Erfolg von der Wahrheit unserer Überzeugungen abhängig. Dennoch kann die Sorge um die Wahrheit nicht mit einem einfachen Verweis auf ihren Nutzen erklärt werden. In diesem Aufsatz verfolge ich zwei Ziele. Zum einen möchte ich verständlich machen, warum instrumentelle Erklärungen der Sorge um die Wahrheit (...) zu kurz greifen. Sie sind defi zitär, da unsere Sorge um die Wahrheit erst dann zu einem philosophischen Problem wird, wenn sie uns so viel abverlangt, dass instrumentelle Überlegungen eine Abkehr von der Wahrheitssuche nahe legen. Wird in solchen Konfl iktsituationen dennoch am Wahrheitsziel festgehalten, so wird die Wahrheit um ihrer selbst willen gesucht. Es entsteht daher die Frage, was es bedeutet, nach der Wahrheit um der Wahrheit willen zu suchen. Eine Erörterung dieser Frage ist das zweite Ziel des Aufsatzes. (shrink)

Das aktuelle politische Zeitgeschehen offenbart zunehmend ein Phänomen, das in der philosophischen Fachliteratur als „Bullshit“ bezeichnet wird. Im Unterschied zum Lügner, der über die Fakten täuschen will, stellt der Bullshitter seine Behauptungen ohne jedwede Orientierung an der Wahrheitsfindung auf. Wir unterscheiden verschiedene Arten von Bullshit und führen das Konzept des demonstrativen Bullshits ein. Wie wir zeigen, hat demonstrativer Bullshit im politischen Diskurs besondere Sprengkraft. Bullshitten politische Akteure demonstrativ, untergraben sie damit die Norm der Wahrheit im gesellschaftlichen Diskurs und tragen auf (...) diese Weise dazu bei, die Grundlage für demokratische Meinungsbildungs- und Entscheidungsprozesse zu zersetzen. Wir zeigen, dass die Digitalisierung die Verbreitung und Akzeptanz demonstrativen Bullshits in der Tendenz begünstigt, und skizzieren, auf welche Weise politische Bildung diesen Entwicklungen entgegenwirken kann. (shrink)

Erarbeitet von Dominik Balg, Anne Burkard, Henning Franzen, Aenna Frottier, David Lanius, David Löwenstein, Hanna Lucks, Kirsten Meyer, Donata Romizi, Katharina Schulz, Stefanie Thiele und Annett Wienmeister. -/- Die Entwicklung argumentativer Fähigkeiten ist ein zentrales Ziel des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts, ja überhaupt ein zentrales Bildungsziel. Wie aber kann das gelingen? In vielen verfügbaren Unterrichtsmaterialien werden argumentative Fähigkeiten eher vorausgesetzt als systematisch gefördert. Auch curriculare Vorgaben bleiben zumeist sehr unspezifisch. Lehrpersonen werden so weitgehend allein gelassen mit der Aufgabe, Lernende (...) beim Erwerb argumentativer Fähigkeiten zu fördern. Die vorliegende Aufgabensammlung soll dazu beitragen, diese Lücke zu schließen. Sie bietet Lehrpersonen reichhaltige Materialien für die spiralcurricular angelegte, systematische Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeit anhand exemplarischer Inhalte. Orientiert an klaren fachlichen Standards finden sich hier Aufgaben auf vier Niveaustufen, jeweils in Verbindung mit übersichtlichen Merkblättern. Die Aufgaben der beiden unteren Niveaustufen lassen sich bereits für jüngere Lernende der Sekundarstufe einsetzen, Aufgaben der obersten Niveaustufe richten sich an Lernende von Abschlussklassen oder der Studieneingangsphase. Für die Hand der Lehrpersonen werden die Aufgaben und Merkblätter durch fachliche und didaktische Kommentare sowie Lösungshinweise ergänzt. (shrink)

Das Funktionieren moderner Demokratien hängt von der Informiertheit der Öffentlichkeit ab. Durch den Erfolg von Fake News und post-faktischer Politik ist die Informiertheit der Öffentlichkeit jedoch in Gefahr, zumal parallele Öffentlichkeiten zunehmend sogenannte alternative analoge und digitale Medienangebote nutzen. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir, wie sich Fake News verbreiten und Einfluss auf Öffentlichkeit und Politik gewinnen. Dazu analysieren wir das Zusammenspiel einer Reihe kognitiver Verzerrungen mit der Funktionsweise sozialer Medien sowie die strukturellen Anreize, die der digitalisierte Medienkapitalismus setzt. Beides spielt (...) der Verbreitung von Fake News in die Hände, was einige politische Akteure auszunutzen wissen. Fake News werden in diesem Fall als Propaganda eingesetzt. Wir unterscheiden vier Funktionen von Fake-News-Propaganda: (1) die Täuschung der Öffentlichkeit, (2) die Stärkung von Gruppenidentitäten, (3) die Demonstration von Macht und (4) die Destabilisierung der politischen oder öffentlichen Ordnung. (shrink)

This paper presents the Spanish translation of the only two texts of Franz Brentano which deal specifically with St. Thomas Aquinas. The first text is a section about St. Albert the Great and Aquinas in an article published during Brentano’s youth, “The History of Ecclesiastical Sciences” (1867). The second text is an article, “Thomas Aquinas” (1908), written at the end of his life. Both texts reveal the immense value that Brentano saw in Aquinas. They also show that he regarded Aquinas (...) mainly as an important interpreter of Aristotle rather than as a philosopher in his own right. Brentano’s approach here also gives us some insight into his own conception of philosophical hermeneutics. The differences between the two texts are evident; for instance, in the second one, there is a Brentano’s manipulation of Aquinas’ thought to justify his leaving the Catholic Faith. The texts are also preceded by a little introduction of mine. Original titles: «Geschichte der kirchlichen Wissenschaften», in: Johann Adam Möhler (ed.), 'Kirchengeschichte', Band 2 (Regensburg: Manz, 1867), pp. 550-556 and «Thomas von Aquin», 'Neue Freie Presse' 15683 (18/4/1908): 1-5. (shrink)

Die Übernahme des KI-Unternehmens DeepMind durch Google für rund eine halbe Milliarde US-Dollar signalisierte vor einem Jahr, dass von der KI-Forschung vielversprechende Ergebnisse erwartet werden. Spätestens seit bekannte Wissenschaftler wie Stephen Hawking und Unternehmer wie Elon Musk oder Bill Gates davor warnen, dass künstliche Intelligenz eine Bedrohung für die Menschheit darstellt, schlägt das KI-Thema hohe Wellen. Die Stiftung für Effektiven Altruismus (EAS, vormals GBS Schweiz) hat mit der Unterstützung von Experten/innen aus Informatik und KI ein umfassendes Diskussionspapier zu den Chancen (...) und Risiken der künstlichen Intelligenz verfasst und geht darin auf aktuelle, mittel- und langfristige Herausforderungen im Bereich der KI-Entwicklung ein. (shrink)

Ich bin sehr an fremde Bücher und besondere Menschengewöhnt, aber Hawkins zeichnet sich durch seine Verwendung einer einfachen Technik zum Testen von Muskelspannung als Schlüssel zur "Wahrheit" jeglicher Art von Aussage überhaupt aus – d.h. nicht nur, ob die getestete Person es glaubt, sondern ob es wirklich wahr ist! Was allgemein bekannt ist, ist, dass Menschen automatische, unbewusste physiologische und psychologische Reaktionen auf fast alles zeigen, was ihnen ausgesetzt ist – Bilder, Geräusche, Berührungen, Gerüche, Ideen, Menschen. Also,, Muskellesen, um herauszufinden, (...) ihre wahren Gefühle ist überhaupt nicht radikal, im Gegensatz zur Verwendung es als Dousing Stick (mehr Muskellesen) zu tun "paranormale Wissenschaft". Hawkins beschreibt die Verwendung abnehmender Spannung in den Muskeln eines Arms als Reaktion auf die Erhöhung der kognitiven Belastung, wodurch der Arm als Reaktion auf den konstanten Druck der Finger eines Menschen abnimmt. Er scheint sich nicht bewusst zu sein, dass es in der Sozialpsychologie seit langem etablierte und umfangreiche Forschungsanstrengungen gibt, die mit solchen Phrasen wie "implizite Kognition", "Automatik" usw. bezeichnet werden, und dass seine Verwendung der "Kinesiologie" ein winziger Abschnitt ist. Neben dem Muskeltonus (selten verwendet) messen Sozialpsychologen EEG, galvanische Hautreaktionen und am häufigsten verbale Reaktionen auf Wörter, Sätze, Bilder oder Situationen manchmal von Sekunden bis Monate nach dem Stimulus. Viele, wie Bargh und Wegner, nehmen die Ergebnisse zu bedeuten, dass wir Automaten sind, die weitgehend ohne Bewusstsein über S1 (automatisiertes System 1) lernen und handeln, und viele andere wie Kihlstrom und Shanks sagen, dass diese Studien fehlerhaft sind und wir Kreaturen von S2 sind (deliberatives System 2). Obwohl Hawkins keine Ahnung zu haben scheint, wie in anderen Bereichen der beschreibenden Psychologie des Denkens höherer Ordnung, ist die Situation in Bezug auf "Automatik" immer noch so chaotisch wie damals, als Wittgenstein die Gründe für die Sterilität und Unfruchtbarkeit der Psychologie in den 30er Jahren beschrieb. Dennoch ist dieses Buch eine einfache Lektüre und einige Therapeuten und spirituelle Lehrer können es von Nutzen finden. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Die jenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Obwohl dieser Band ein wenig datiert ist, gibt es nur wenige aktuelle populäre Bücher, die sich speziell mit der Psychologie des Mordes beschäftigen und es ist ein schneller Überblick für ein paar Dollar, also noch wert die Mühe. Es macht keinen Versuch, umfassend zu sein und ist stellenweise etwas oberflächlich, wobei der Leser erwartet, die Lücken aus seinen vielen anderen Büchern und der umfangreichen Literatur über Gewalt zu füllen. Für ein Update siehe z.B. Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd (...) ed. V1 (2016) S. 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 und Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) P 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 309–312, 410 und Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). Er gehört seit mehreren Jahrzehnten zu den beste Evolutions psychologen und deckt in seinen Arbeiten ein breites Spektrum an Verhaltensweisen ab, aber hier konzentriert er sich fast ausschließlich auf die psychologischen Mechanismen, die einzelne Menschen zum Mord führen, und ihre mögliche evolutionäre Funktion im EWR (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation – d.h. die Ebenen Afrikas in den letzten Millionen Jahren oder so). -/- Buss beginnt mit der Erkenntnis, dass wie bei anderen Verhaltensweisen "alternative" Erklärungen wie Psychopathologie, Eifersucht, soziales Umfeld, Gruppendruck, Drogen und Alkohol usw. nicht wirklich erklären, da die Frage nach wie vor bleibt, warum diese mörderische Impulse erzeugen, d.h. sie sind die nahen Ursachen und nicht die ultimativen evolutionären (genetischen) Ursachen. Wie immer läuft es unweigerlich auf inklusive Fitness (genetische Fitness von Verwandten) und damit auf den Kampf um den Zugang zu Kumpels und Ressourcen hinaus, der die ultimative Erklärung für das gesamte Verhalten in allen Organismen ist. Soziologische Daten (und der gesunde Menschenverstand) machen deutlich, dass jüngere ärmere Männchen am ehesten töten. Er präsentiert seine eigenen und andere Morddaten aus Industrienationen und Stammeskulturen, konspeziertes Töten von Tieren, Archäologie, FBI-Daten und seine eigene Forschung über die Mordfantasien normaler Menschen. Viele archäologische Beweise häufen sich weiterhin von Morden, einschließlich der von ganzen Gruppen oder von Gruppen abzüglich junger Frauen, in prähistorischen Zeiten. -/- Nachdem ich Buss' Kommentare untersucht habe, präsentiere ich eine sehr kurze Zusammenfassung der absichtlichen Psychologie (die logische Struktur der Rationalität), die in meinen vielen anderen Artikeln und Büchern ausführlich behandelt wird. -/- Diejenigen, die viel Zeit haben, die eine detaillierte Geschichte mörderischer Gewalt aus evolutionärer Perspektive wollen, können Steven Pinkers "The Better Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined" (2012) und meineRezension, leicht im Netz und in zwei meiner jüngsten Bücher lesen. Kurz, Pinker stellt fest, dass Mord hat stetig und dramatisch um den Faktor etwa 30 seit unseren Tagen als Forager gesunken. Obwohl Waffen es jetzt für jeden extrem einfach machen, zu töten, ist Tötung viel seltener. Pinker glaubt, dass dies auf verschiedene soziale Mechanismen zurückzuführen ist, die unsere "besseren Engel" hervorbringen, aber ich denke, es ist hauptsächlich auf die vorübergehende Fülle von Ressourcen durch die gnadenlose Vergewaltigung unseres Planeten zurückzuführen, gepaart mit erhöhter Polizeipräsenz, mit Kommunikations- und Überwachungs- und Rechtssystemen, die es viel wahrscheinlicher machen, bestraft zu werden. Dies wird jedes Mal deutlich, wenn es sogar eine kurze und lokale Abwesenheit der Polizei gibt. -/- Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Die progressive Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen ist ein politisch viel diskutiertes, aber sozialethisch wenig reflektiertes Thema. In diesem Beitrag wird dargelegt, wie progressive Steuern auf Einkommen und Vermögen in einem Wohlfahrtsstaat aus Perspektive der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, wie sie von David Miller konzipiert wird, gerechtfertigt werden können. Um das Argument so einfach wie möglich zu gestalten, orientiert sich die Fragestellung dabei an der notwendigen Funktion der Bekämpfung von Armut, derer sich Wohlfahrtsstaaten als einer Forderung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit zu verpflichten (...) haben. Progressive Steuern auf Einkommen und Vermögen sind somit genau dann und in genau jener Höhe gerechtfertigt, als sie zur Bekämpfung von Armut notwendig sind. Darüber hinaus kann gezeigt werden, dass die progressive Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen einfach und effizient dieses Ziel erreichen kann, da sie, anders als Massensteuern oder die einheitliche Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen, nicht wohlfahrtsstaatlich ausgeglichen werden müssen. (shrink)

David Hyder.The Determinate World: Kant and Helmholtz on the Physical Meaning of Geometry. viii + 229 pp., bibl., index. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009.

En este artículo realizamos una reconstrucción del Programa original de Hilbert antes del surgimiento de los teoremas limitativos de la tercera década del siglo pasado. Para tal reconstrucción empezaremos por mostrar lo que Torretti llama los primeros titubeos formales de Hilbert, es decir, la defensa por el método axiomático como enfoque fundamentante. Seguidamente, mostraremos como estos titubeos formales se establecen como un verdadero programa de investigación lógico-matemático y como dentro de dicho programa la inquietud por la decidibilidad de los problemas (...) matemáticos y en específico la decidibilidad de la Lógica de primer orden cobra peso. Luego pasamos a analizar como la inquietud por la decibilidad toma lugar dentro del pensamiento filosófico-matemático de Hilbert presentándose como uno de los grandes problemas a los cuales la metamatemática debe encontrar una solución, esto lo hacemos mostrando un contraste con autores, como John von Neumann y Roberto Torretti, quienes de alguna u otra manera no interpretan el problema de la decidibilidad de la Lógica de primer orden como un problema de peso dentro del programa original de Hilbert. Finalmente argumentamos que el resultado meta-teórico de Church puede entenderse como una refutación del optimismo intelectual que permea a todo el programa original de Hilbert. (shrink)

David Bohm, in his "causal theory", made the correct Hegelian synthesis of Einstein's thesis that there is a "there" there, and Bohr's antithesis of "thinglessness" (Nick Herbert’s term). Einstein was a materialist and Bohr was an idealist. Bohm showed that quantum reality has both. This is “physical dualism” (my term). Physical dualism may be a low energy approximation to a deeper monism of cosmic consciousness called "the super-implicate order" (Bohm and Hiley’s term), “pregeometry” (Wheeler’s term), “substratum” (Dirac’s term), “funda-MENTAL (...) space” (Hameroff’s term), “Chi” (Chinese medicine & Falun Gong) etc., but for our immediate pragmatic purpose of constructing naturally conscious nano-computers and of virtually reverse engineering alleged reports of propellantless UFO propulsion (French Intelligence Report, 1999 [email protected] Vol. 5, No. 11, Part 1 -- August 1, 1999 & NIDS report "Best UFO Cases - Europe", I. Von Ludwiger) to the stars and beyond, physical dualism will work. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Eino Kaila's (1890-1958) understanding of David Hume. Kaila was one of the leading Finnish philosophers of the 20th century and a correspondent of the Vienna Circle. He introduced logical empiricism into Finland and taught Georg Henrik von Wright. Final draft.

1. Introduction: a look back at the reasons vs. causes debate. 2. The interventionist account of causation. 3. Four objections to interventionism. 4. The counterfactual analysis of event causation. 5. The role of free agency. 6. Causality in the human sciences. -- The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are causal or not. Melden, (...) Peters, Winch, Kenny and Anscombe had contributed their anticausal conceptions. The neo-Wittgensteinians seemed to be winning the day when in 1963 Donald Davidson published his seminal paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Davidson’s paper devastated the Wittgensteinian camp. It contained, among other things, a powerful attack on the logical connection argument. Davidson argued that the existence of a logical or conceptual connection between descriptions can never eliminate a causal relation, which holds between events simpliciter, not between events under certain descriptions. Davidson maintained that in a way, reasons can be causes. When somebody acts for a certain reason, his intentional attitudes, or rather changes in his attitudes, cause his bodily movements. Davidson also argued that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. For the definition of action, he argued that intentional actions are bodily movements caused in the right way by beliefs and desires that rationalize them. Davidson’s paper paved the way for causal theories of action, which superseded neo-Wittgensteinian analyses in the following decades. The causal theory was rapidly adopted by Alvin Goldman, David Armstrong, Paul Churchland, Myles Brand and many others, entering the mainstream and dominating the philosophy of action to this very day. In 1971 Georg Henrik von Wright published his book "Explanation and Understanding". The second chapter did not deal with agency, but with causation. It developed a new account of causation, the interventionist or experimentalist account. Focusing on causation, von Wright remedied a major shortcoming of the reasons vs. causes debate. The concept of causality, and the nature of the causal relation, received little attention in this debate, a fact that holds true for both camps. Mostly it was simply taken for granted that, as Hempel had declared, “causal explanation is a special type of deductive-nomological explanation”. One camp then aligned intentional explanations with D-N explanations, while the other camp insisted on their disparity. So strictly speaking, the label “reasons/causes debate” was a misnomer. The controversy dealt primarily with the question as to whether intentional explanations can take the form of D-N explanations, while the notion of causation, and the metaphysics of the causal relation, were left obscured. With von Wright’s new approach, the situation changed. Von Wright was primarily concerned with causation, but his approach contained an implicit attack on the causal theory of action as well. His core idea was that the notion of causality is intimately linked with, or even derived from, the notion of intentionally making something happen. Other philosophers, even Hume, had considered such a connection before, but often just to reject this view, regarding it as a kind of myth belonging to the infancy of the human mind. Von Wright took the idea seriously. He submitted the analysis that p is the cause of q if and only if by doing p we could bring about q. The causal theory of action was also concerned with the relation between causation and agency, to which its name bears witness. The causal theory of action holds that actions are bodily movements with a certain causal history. This is why von Wright’s account constituted a momentous challenge to the causal theory: it reversed the direction of conceptual dependency between both notions. Davidson and his followers tried to define what an intentional action is by using the notion of causation. The causal condition which the causal theory sets is part of the definition of “doing something intentionally”. Von Wright claimed that the conceptual dependency is the other way round. He used the notions of doing, and bringing about, to explain what causal relations are. So, instead of a causal theory of action, he advocated an agency theory of causation, as it may be dubbed. It is remarkable how seldom this clash of opinions about conceptual primacy is reflected in the literature. There are few exceptions: Fred Stoutland noticed the conflict, and he published a number of papers in which he compared Davidson’s and von Wright’s views. Von Wright’s book "Explanation and Understanding" was widely read and discussed in the seventies, especially in Europe. But it strikes me that especially in North America, where the causal theory of action became the orthodoxy of the day, von Wright’s challenge went largely unnoticed. Even Davidson did not seem to take it seriously. He nowhere takes notice of the interventionist theory of causation, while he does discuss von Wright’s earlier book "Norm and Action". As is well-known, Davidson favoured an alternative account of causation, based on “the principle of the nomological character of causality”, as he somewhat clumsily called it, or, later and less clumsily, “the cause-law thesis”. Davidson’s firm adherence to a nomological theory of causality may explain why he did not take much interest in alternative accounts. [...] -/- . 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Review of The Philosophical Origins of Austrian Economics, by David Gordon. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1993.

How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.

Modal logic is one of philosophy’s many children. As a mature adult it has moved out of the parental home and is nowadays straying far from its parent. But the ties are still there: philosophy is important to modal logic, modal logic is important for philosophy. Or, at least, this is a thesis we try to defend in this chapter. Limitations of space have ruled out any attempt at writing a survey of all the work going on in our field—a (...) book would be needed for that. Instead, we have tried to select material that is of interest in its own right or exemplifies noteworthy features in interesting ways. Here are some themes that have guided us throughout the writing: • The back-and-forth between philosophy and modal logic. There has been a good deal of give-and-take in the past. Carnap tried to use his modal logic to throw light on old philosophical questions, thereby inspiring others to continue his work and still others to criticise it. He certainly provoked Quine, who in his turn provided—and continues to provide—a healthy challenge to modal logicians. And Kripke’s and David Lewis’s philosophies are connected, in interesting ways, with their modal logic. Analytic philosophy would have been a lot different without modal logic! • The interpretation problem. The problem of providing a certain modal logic with an intuitive interpretation should not be conflated with the problem of providing a formal system with a model-theoretic semantics. An intuitively appealing model-theoretic semantics may be an important step towards solving the interpretation problem, but only a step. One may compare this situation with that in probability theory, where definitions of concepts like ‘outcome space’ and ‘random variable’ are orthogonal to questions about “interpretations” of the concept of probability. • The value of formalisation. Modal logic sets standards of precision, which are a challenge to—and sometimes a model for—philosophy. Classical philosophical questions can be sharpened and seen from a new perspective when formulated in a framework of modal logic. On the other hand, representing old questions in a formal garb has its dangers, such as simplification and distortion. • Why modal logic rather than classical (first or higher order) logic? The idioms of modal logic—today there are many!—seem better to correspond to human ways of thinking than ordinary extensional logic. (Cf. Chomsky’s conjecture that the NP + VP pattern is wired into the human brain.) In his An Essay in Modal Logic (1951) von Wright distinguished between four kinds of modalities: alethic (modes of truth: necessity, possibility and impossibility), epistemic (modes of being known: known to be true, known to be false, undecided), deontic (modes of obligation: obligatory, permitted, forbidden) and existential (modes of existence: universality, existence, emptiness). The existential modalities are not usually counted as modalities, but the other three categories are exemplified in three sections into which this chapter is divided. Section 1 is devoted to alethic modal logic and reviews some main themes at the heart of philosophical modal logic. Sections 2 and 3 deal with topics in epistemic logic and deontic logic, respectively, and are meant to illustrate two different uses that modal logic or indeed any logic can have: it may be applied to already existing (non-logical) theory, or it can be used to develop new theory. (shrink)

Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses have been motivated using verificationism, (...) externalism, and coherentism. I argue that a more powerful veridicalist response to global skepticism can be motivated by structuralism, on which physical entities are understood as those that play a certain structural role. I develop the structuralist response and address objections. (shrink)

I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes (...) in real life. He is modeled partly after Peter van Inwagen and partly on myself when I first worried about van Inwagen's argument against compatibilism. (shrink)

What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it (...) takes to do so. This idea is developed into a full-fledged account, Rylean responsibilism, which understands know-how in terms of the normative guidance and responsible control of one's acts. Within the complex current debate about know-how, this view occupies a middle ground position between the intellectualist claim that know-how just is propositional or objectual knowledge and the anti-intellectualist claim that know-how just is ability. In genuine know-how, practical ability and guiding intellect are both necessary, but essentially intertwined. (shrink)

Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have proliferated over the past decade, but there has been little systematic investigation of which of them can accommodate its badness. This paper is such a study. In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-instrumental disvalue of pain's unpleasantness; and those who allow it but deny that it can be accommodated by the view—advanced by me and others—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive experiences with evaluative content. Against the former, I argue (...) that pain's unpleasantness does indeed have noninstrumental disvalue; against the latter I argue both that my critics’ own desire-theoretic accounts of pain's unpleasantness cannot accommodate such disvalue, and that my evaluativist view can—either by appealing to “anti-unpleasantness” desires or by exploiting pain's perceptuality. (shrink)

Two separate research programs have revealed two different factors that feature in our judgments of whether some entity persists. One program—inspired by Knobe—has found that normative considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when the changes it undergoes lead to improvements. The other program—inspired by Kelemen—has found that teleological considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when it preserves its purpose. Our goal (...) in this paper is to determine what causes persistence judgments. Across four studies, we pit normative considerations against teleological considerations. And using causal modeling procedures, we find a consistent, robust pattern with teleological and not normative considerations directly causing persistence judgments. Our findings put teleology in the driver’s seat, while at the same time shedding further light on our folk notion of an object. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide and defend what may be the first actual argument in support of P. F. Strawson's merely stated vision of a response-dependent theory of moral responsibility. It does so by way of an extended analogy with the funny. In part 1, it makes the easier and less controversial case for response-dependence about the funny. In part 2, it shows the tight analogy between anger and amusement in developing the harder and more controversial case for response-dependence about (...) a kind of blameworthiness. It then defends the view from three serious skeptical challenges. (shrink)

A critical examination of the Reflection principle in Bayesian epistemology, and of the diachronic Dutch-book-style arguments that have been invoked to support Reflection and Conditionalization.

An e-book devoted to 13 critical discussions of Thaddeus Metz's book "Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study", with a lengthy reply from the author. -/- Preface Masahiro Morioka i -/- Précis of Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study Thaddeus Metz ii-vi -/- Source and Bearer: Metz on the Pure Part-Life View of Meaning Hasko von Kriegstein 1-18 -/- Fundamentality and Extradimensional Final Value David Matheson 19-32 -/- Meaningful and More Meaningful: A Modest Measure Peter Baumann 33-49 -/- Is Meaning (...) in Life Comparable?: From the Viewpoint of ‘The Heart of Meaning in Life’ Masahiro Morioka 50-65 -/- Agreement and Sympathy: On Metz’s Meaning in Life Sho Yamaguchi 66-89 -/- Metz’s Quest for the Holy Grail James Tartaglia 90-111 -/- Meaning without Ego Christopher Ketcham 112-133 -/- Death and the Meaning of Life: A Critical Study of Metz’s Meaning in Life Fumitake Yoshizawa 134-149 -/- Metz’ Incoherence Objection: Some Epistemological Considerations Nicholas Waghorn 150-168 -/- Meaning in Consequences Mark Wells 169-179 -/- Defending the Purpose Theory of Meaning in Life Jason Poettcker 180-207 -/- Review of Thaddeus Metz’s Meaning in Life Minao Kukita 208-214 -/- A Psychological Model to Determine Meaning in Life and Meaning of Life Yu Urata 215-227 -/- Assessing Lives, Giving Supernaturalism Its Due, and Capturing Naturalism: Reply to 13 Critics of Meaning in Life Thaddeus Metz 228-278 . (shrink)

The old evidence problem affects any probabilistic confirmation measure based on comparing pr(H/E) and pr(H). The article argues for the following points: (1) measures based on likelihood ratios also suffer old evidence difficulties; (2) the less-discussed synchronic old evidence problem is, in an important sense, the most acute; (3) prominent attempts to solve or dissolve the synchronic problem fail; (4) a little-discussed variant of the standard measure avoids the problem, in an appealing way; and (5) this measure nevertheless reveals a (...) different problem for probabilistic confirmation measures, a problem that is unlikely to lend itself to formal solution. (shrink)

A growing literature is premised on the claim that quantum mechanics provides evidence for metaphysical indeterminacy. But does it? None of the currently fashionable realist interpretations involve fundamental indeterminacy and the ‘standard interpretation’, to the extent that it can be made out, doesn't require indeterminacy either.

Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by brain damage, usually in adulthood. Asymbolics feel pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to visual and verbal threats. How should we make sense of this? Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains unpleasant and motivating. Colin Klein thinks that what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making them unresponsive to unpleasant pain. I argue that an (...) illuminating account requires elements of both views. Asymbolic pains are indeed abnormal, but they are abnormal because asymbolics are. I agree with Klein that asymbolics are incapable of caring about their bodily integrity; but I argue against him that, if this is to explain not only their indifference to visual and verbal threat, but also their indifference to pain, we must do the following: (i) take asymbolics’ lack of bodily care not as an alternative to, but as an explanation of their pains’ missing a component, and (ii) claim that the missing component consists in evaluative content. Asymbolia, I conclude, reveals not only that unpleasant pain is composite, but that its ‘hedomotive component’ is evaluative. (shrink)

To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with particular reference to personal identity. First I argue that overemphasis (...) of the problem of consciousness has had an unhealthy effect on recent debate, claiming instead that we should emphasize the concept of form. Then I bring in the concept of identity by means of the notion of substantial form. I continue by analyzing the relation between form and matter, defending the traditional theses of prime matter and of the unicity of substantial form. I then argue for the immateriality of the substantial form of the human person, viz. the soul, from an account of the human intellect. From this follows the soul's essential independence of matter. Finally, although the soul is the immaterial bearer of personal identity, that identity is still the identity of an essentially embodied being. I explain how these ideas are to be reconciled. Footnotesa I am grateful to Stephen Braude, John Cottingham, John Haldane, David Jehle, Joel Katzav, Eduardo Ortiz, and Fred Sommers for helpful comments and discussion of a draft of this essay. I would also like to thank Ellen Paul, whose suggestions have helped greatly to improve the essay's style and content. (shrink)

Do motivational limitations due to human nature constrain the demands of justice? Among those who say no, David Estlund offers perhaps the most compelling argument. Taking Estlund’s analysis of “ability” as a starting point, I show that motivational deficiencies can constrain the demands of justice under at least one common circumstance — that the motivationally-deficient agent makes a good faith effort to overcome her deficiency. In fact, my argument implies something stronger; namely, that the demands of justice are constrained (...) by what people are sufficiently likely to be motivated to do. Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, it is the business of ideal theory — not just nonideal theory — to work with the motivational capacities people are likely enough to have. (See also Estlund's reply in the same issue of EJPT and my rejoinder on Philpapers.). (shrink)

Many philosophers embrace grounding, supposedly a central notion of metaphysics. Grounding is widely assumed to be irreflexive, but recently a number of authors have questioned this assumption: according to them, it is at least possible that some facts ground themselves. The primary purpose of this paper is to problematize the notion of self-grounding through the theoretical roles usually assigned to grounding. The literature typically characterizes grounding as at least playing two central theoretical roles: a structuring role and an explanatory role. (...) Once we carefully spell out what playing these roles includes, however, we find that any notion of grounding that isn’t irreflexive fails to play these roles when they are interpreted narrowly, and is redundant for playing them when they are interpreted more broadly. The upshot is that no useful notion of grounding can allow a fact to ground itself. (shrink)

This article uses the case study of ethnobiological classification to develop a positive and a negative thesis about the state of natural kind debates. On the one hand, I argue that current accounts of natural kinds can be integrated in a multidimensional framework that advances understanding of classificatory practices in ethnobiology. On the other hand, I argue that such a multidimensional framework does not leave any substantial work for the notion “natural kind” and that attempts to formulate a general account (...) of naturalness have become an obstacle to understanding classificatory practices. (shrink)